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1. Migration in Europe: A Global Perspective 
Changes in the size of a population depend on the development of its three main 
driving factors: fertility and mortality rates (resulting in changes in the so-called natural 
increase), and migration rates. Fertility rates in Europe declined during the past 
decades, implying in addition to the direct negative effect on population growth that 
smaller cohorts of women reached and will reach reproductive age. If low fertility rates 
persist, the impact on the size of a population will enforce itself over the following 
generations. Life expectancy in Europe, on the other hand, improved by about 12 years 
since 1950 and likewise the impact of migration on population numbers increased over 
the past 50 years in Europe and has been persistently positive since the 1970s (United 
Nations, 2012). This report assesses how these demographic changes, and in 
particular migration trends, can influence Europe’s economic future. By providing an 
overview on the characteristics of current migrants – in terms of their age structure as 
well as in terms of their human capital potential – as well as projecting future flows and 
by reviewing the current literature on the determinants of migration, an attempt of a 
simultaneous consideration of the quantity and the quality perspective of migration is 
undertaken. 
Considering population projections for the EU28 over the 21st century, state-of-the-art 
middle-of-the-road scenarios (see Lutz et al., 2014) indicate that population will grow 
for five more decades, peak around 2065 and decreasing by 2100 to the same levels 
expected by 2020. Current and expected population dynamics across EU countries are 
relatively heterogeneous. While Germany and many Central and Eastern European 
economies (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Romania) are already experiencing negative growth rates of population, some EU 
countries are expected to experience population increases throughout the period 2015-
2100 (Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden, United Kingdom).  
The low levels of fertility in Europe have led to a steady increase in the proportion of 
population in older age groups over the last decades. While in 1985 the share of 
European persons aged 65 or above in the working age population (defined as people 
aged 20 to 64) was approximately 19.5%, this figure rose to over 26.5% in 2010. The 
old-age dependency ratio is expected to increase further in the decades to come and 
the potentially painful economic consequences of such ageing trends for Europe are 
often discussed in the policy arena. It is widely accepted that migration plays a central 
role as a determinant of both the age structure of Europe in the future and the 
economic outcomes in a context of ageing European populations.        
The importance of future migration flows as a counteracting force for the expected age 
structure changes in EU 28 are evident from Figure 1, where we depict the projected 
population pyramid for EU28, as well as those for EU15 (old Western European EU 
members, whose accession date is prior to 2004) and EU13 (which comprises the new 
member states, whose accession date is 2004 or later). In Figure 1 we highlight (in light 
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green in the graphs) the projected contribution of new immigrants to Europe’s 
population over the next four decades using the middle-of-the-road projections in Lutz 
et al. (2014). The differences between EU15 and EU13 are striking, with EU15 
benefiting of a “rejuvenation” of its population thanks to the expected inflow of migrants, 
while ageing trends accelerate in EU13. The net number of migrants for EU13 
countries during 2005 and 2010 – that is the difference between the number of 
immigrants and the number of emigrants – shows that Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Bulgaria had more emigrants than immigrants and thus 
migration caused a decline in the population of these countries. Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Malta, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic received more immigrants 
than they lost to emigration, and migration had a positive impact on the size of the 
population. Considering EU15 countries for comparison, the striking difference is that 
no country exhibits negative net migration rates during the same period. 
 
Figure 1 Population pyramids and projections for 2010, 2030 and 2050 
 
Source: IIASA/VID data (Lutz et al., 2014). 
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The future of economic growth in EU28 will thus depend to a large extent on whether 
young migrants possess the skills required to contribute efficiently to the creation of 
wealth and on their integration in European labour markets. Understanding the 
consequences of migration flows for the future of Europe implies that we need to carry 
out a thorough assessment of the characteristics of these migrants. A natural starting 
point is to study empirically the origin of migration flows to European countries. In spite 
of the importance of the study of population flows across countries for the social 
sciences, global datasets on migration flows have not been available until very 
recently. The research efforts carried out by Abel and Sander (2014) have led to the 
development of a dataset on bilateral migration flows between 196 countries from 1990 
to 2010. Abel and Sander (2014) provide estimated flows using maximum likelihood 
estimates for the migration movements required to meet the changes observed over 
time in migrant stock data, which are available.  
Using these migration flows, so-called circular migration plots can be used to depict the 
origin and destination of migrants over a period of time. Figure 2 presents two circular 
plots that show the flows of migrants from and to Europe as a whole (top panel) and 
from outside of Europe to each European country (bottom panel) for the period 2005-
2010. The circular plots represent migration flows in the form of surfaces linking world 
regions or countries, which in turn constitute segments of the circle with different 
colours. The width of the flow is proportional to the size of the migration movement and 
the region or country of origin determines its colour (see Sander et al., 2014, for a 
detailed description of circular plots as a data visualization tool in migration research). 
From a global perspective, the largest share of the migration flows observed in Europe 
is composed of population movements across countries within the continent. These are 
followed by migration flows from Africa, Latin America and South Asia (in this order). 
The distribution of migrants by country of origin in terms of destination countries is 
relatively asymmetric in Europe, as would be expected given the differences in 
language and cultural links in the continent. The largest flows of Latin American 
migrants in the period 2005-2010, for example, tended to concentrate in Spain and, to 
a lesser extent, Italy. On the other hand, the largest share of the migration flows from 
Africa had France, United Kingdom, Spain and Italy as destination countries.    
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Figure 2 Migration flows to and from Europe as a world region (top) and by country 
(bottom), 2005-2010 
 
 
Source: Abel and Sander (2014). 
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2. Who Are the Migrants? Education and Age 
Distribution of Migrants  
Besides the sheer number of immigrants to Europe, their characteristics in terms of age 
and education crucially shape the economic impact of immigration. Using data from the 
stocks of immigrants to 17 EU countries, the population structure, in terms of broad age 
group, education as well as gender, is visualized in Figure 3. The grey parts 
correspond to the population born in the 17 EU countries, whereas for immigrants 
different shades of reds are used. It is apparent that in particular in the age group of 25 
to 64 year olds, immigrants constitute a considerable part of the population. Given 
current and expected demographic trends, the age structure of migrants is thus indeed 
serving as a mechanism to increase the share of working age population in Europe. 
Due to its role in terms of altering the age structure of European population, the effect 
of immigration on economic growth developments at the macroeconomic level can be 
analyzed making use of our empirical knowledge of so-called demographic dividend 
effects. Starting with Bloom and Williamson (1998) and Lindh and Malmberg (1999), 
the importance of changes in age structure (and in particular, in the relative size of 
working age population) as a determinant of income growth patterns has been widely 
recognized in the literature on population economics (see also Bloom et al., 2007). 
Recent developments in the empirical analysis of the linkage between demographic 
change and economic growth emphasize the central role that education plays as a 
catalyst of the economic growth effects of demographic developments which lead to 
changes in age structure. Crespo Cuaresma and Mishra (2011) or Crespo Cuaresma 
et al. (2014b), for instance, highlight the importance of analyzing age-structured 
educational attainment data to assess how changes in age structure translate to 
income growth changes.  
To the extent that migration flows towards Europe alter the relative size of population 
by age group, their rejuvenation effect on Europe’s population can be thought of as 
creating a migration demographic dividend, whose potentially beneficial effects will be 
realized depending on the skills of migrants. The education level of immigrants will thus 
be one of the key determinants of future economic growth in Europe.         
In Figure 4 the educational attainment of migrants to 17 EU countries is compared to 
the average education of this destination region. The comparison of education levels is 
based on the proportion of population with educational attainment level beyond 
secondary education and is presented for two different age groups: the total population 
aged 15 and older (top), as well as the young population aged 15 to 24 (bottom). The 
top chart in Figure 4 shows that a large part of the migrants with above-average 
education levels correspond to within-EU population flows, and in particular emigrants 
from France, Austria and the Netherlands as well as Romania, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary appear to have a considerably higher educational attainment than the average 
of the destination countries.  
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Figure 3 Population of EU15 (+POL, +CZE) by gender (left part: male, right part: 
female), broad age group, education and migration status, 2005-2006 
 
Source: OECD DIOC 2005/06 
 
Immigrants originating in the United States, India, Iran and Switzerland tend also to be 
better educated than the destination region’s population average, and with a share of 
secondary education or higher of 82%, US immigrants exhibit the highest positive 
educational gap among the top sending countries.1  
Immigrants that tend to have lower education than the individuals born in the 
destination region come from former Soviet republics, South East Europe, North Africa 
and southern EU member countries. In addition, Turkish immigrants exhibit lower 
education levels than the population in the destination regions – the difference in the 
share of individuals with secondary education and above amounts to over 40%.  
                                                     
1
 It should be noted that there is a large number of sending countries whose emigrants are better educated 
than the EU 15 (+POL, +CZE)’s average – Japan, Mexico, South Africa and several Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries are just some examples. However, they are not included in the graph since the number of 
immigrants currently living in the 17 European countries was below the threshold of 100.000 and thus they 
do not constitute a major sending country. 
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Figure 4 Difference between the education of migrants to EU 15 (+POL, +CZE) and the 
education of EU 15 (+POL, +CZE)-born individuals: age group 15+ (top) and 
age group 15-24 (bottom). 
 
 
Note: Country of origin on the vertical axis. Only origin countries with more than 10.000 (young) and 100.000 (total) 
migrants living in the 17 EU countries are included in the graph. 
Source: Own computations based on OECD DIOC 2005/06 data and IIASA/VID data. 
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It is important to point out that at this stage no distinction has been made concerning 
more detailed age groups of immigrants. To the extent that the education composition 
of migrants changed over time, this descriptive analysis might be of limited use for 
assessing the educational attainment of future migrants. Thus, in the bottom graph in 
Figure 4, the comparison of education among immigrants and EU-natives is repeated 
using exclusively the age group comprising 15 to 24 year-olds. This figure shows that 
for young immigrants the negative educational differentials are narrower, and positive 
educational differentials are more pronounced. Among the top sending countries with 
particularly well educated young immigrants are China, India, Iran and Vietnam, as well 
as a number of Sub-Saharan African countries, namely Senegal, Cameroon and Cote 
d’Ivoire.2 Southern and Eastern EU member countries, as well as South-Eastern 
European countries appear to have a lower share of secondary and tertiary educated 
young immigrants, as do immigrants from Central and West Asia.  
In Figure 5, the education differential between working age immigrants and the 
population in the 17 EU countries is put in relation with that of the young population (15 
to 24 years) in the form of a scatterplot. Higher education differentials among the young 
immigrants imply an improvement of the education of the young immigrants compared 
to earlier immigrants,3 and in that case the respective countries are expected to lie 
above the 45 degree line. If the educational differential of young immigrants is similar to 
that of the total working age population of immigrants (above 15 years of age) for a 
given country, it will be allocated close to the 45 degree reference line, and in case of a 
decrease of educational attainment, a country would be placed below the line. 
Countries marked in dark blue correspond to EU member countries. 
The insights provided by Figure 5 imply that the skill advantage of immigrants (as 
measured through educational attainment) compared to individuals born in the 
destination countries increased. European countries not belonging to the EU are 
coloured in red, and are mainly placed along or below the reference 45° line. This 
indicates that young immigrants from sending countries which traditionally send better 
educated migrants than natives have lost some of their advantage, while immigrants 
from countries sending less educated migrants have reduced their disadvantage on 
average. No clear picture, however, is discernible for African immigrants. 
                                                     
2 Immigrants from other Sub-Saharan African countries that are better educated than the host region are 
Gabon, Mauritius, Benin, Congo, Mali, Angola or Niger. Also Central American and Caribbean immigrants, 
although comparably small in magnitude, tend to be better educated on average. 
3 For the sake of completeness it should be noted that such a finding could likewise imply that the 
education of the destination region was decreasing. This, however, can be disregarded as education levels 
within the EU have improved systematically during the last decades. 
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Figure 5 Education differential4 between immigrants and natives: young cohorts vs. 
total population. Linear fit (dashed line) and 45 degree line (solid line). 
 
Source: Own computations based on OECD DIOC 2005/06 data 
 
While for some countries, in particular North African countries as well as Senegal, Cote 
d’Ivoire or Mauritius, the education differential improved, for others such as Somalia, 
Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan or Nigeria it decreased. 
Older cohorts of most Central and South American and Caribbean immigrants tend to 
exhibit higher education than EU natives. While this is still true for a set of American 
countries, the advantages in terms of education declined for most young immigrants. 
For Central Asian immigrants a similar pattern is found, but South Asian countries, 
most noteworthy are China, India, Malaysia, Vietnam, Sir Lanka and Lao P.D.R. the 
education differential is considerably better for the younger cohorts. 
These results need to be put in the context of the existing differentials in 
intergenerational education mobility between migrants and native populations. In their 
study of second-generation migrants from non-EU countries to Austria, Schneebaum et 
al. (2014) present robust evidence concerning the fact that migrants present higher 
                                                     
4
 The education differential is computed as the difference in the shares of individuals with secondary or 
tertiary education between immigrants to and natives from 17 EU countries. The country labels indicate 
the source country of the migrants. 
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levels of intergenerational educational persistence than natives. Migrant men tend to 
present higher education mobility than both native men and women, while migrant 
women face the most stringent degree of intergenerational persistence of educational 
attainment. Second generation migrant women, thus, confront what Schneebaum et al. 
(2014) dub a “double disadvantage” in the sense of being the most immobile group in 
terms of intergenerational education persistence and also present the worst 
educational outcomes. Improving intergenerational educational mobility for migrants, 
and in particular for female migrants, appears thus as one of the outcomes that policy 
should aim for in order to reap the benefits of migration over the forthcoming decades.  
Figure 6 approaches the question of how the education structure of emigrants to EU 
countries compares to the education of the population in their country of origin. Again, 
the analysis is undertaken for the total population above the age of 15 as well as for the 
young population aged between 15 and 24. The education differentials are computed 
for the most important sending countries and are ranked from highest to lowest. The 
top graph in Figure 6 shows that not only immigrants from China, India, Vietnam or Iran 
tend to be better educated than the population born in EU countries, but also they 
constitute a highly positive selection from the origin country population in terms of their 
average education levels. The share of secondary or higher education among the 
immigrants to EU countries is roughly 40% higher than in China, India, Vietnam and 
Iran, respectively. Similarly, immigrants originating in some North African countries are 
considerably better educated than those individuals in the source countries that 
decided not to emigrate. 
Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria are among the top sending countries of EU immigrants, 
and the graph shows that particularly those with above-average education are moving 
to the 17 EU countries. EU countries appear to receive a negative selection in terms of 
education from South East European countries as well as from selected former Soviet 
countries. Within EU member states, migrants from Greece, Croatia, Slovak Republic, 
Germany, the Czech Republic and Poland also tend to be less educated that the non-
migrating population. The United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Hungary and 
Austria, however, are EU countries whose emigrants are characterized by high 
education compared to their national counterparts. Whether similar patterns are 
observed when only the younger generations are considered is assessed in the bottom 
chart in Figure 6. An interesting finding is that educational gaps between emigrants and 
the source country population – positive as well as negative – are higher for younger 
cohorts. On the one hand, young Asian emigrants, from China, India, Vietnam or Iran, 
are considerably better educated than the young population in the EU destination 
regions, but on the other hand, the negative educational differentials of emigrants from 
South East European and former Soviet countries appear to be even larger among the 
young emigrants. 
The net economic impact of brain drain migration on source countries depends on the 
relative size of two opposing effects.  
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Figure 6 Difference between the education of migrants to EU 15 (+POL, +CZE) and the 
education of individuals in source country: age group 15+ (top) and age group 
15-24 (bottom). 
 
 
Note: Country of origin on the vertical axis. Only origin countries with more than 10.000 (young)/100.000 (total) migrants 
living in the 17 EU countries are included in the graph. 
Source: Own computations based on OECD DIOC 2005/06 data and IIASA/VID data. 
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A positive effect is fuelled by the improved incentives to invest in higher levels of 
education, while a detrimental drain effect is caused by highly educated natives leaving 
the country. Empirically, the net effect of brain drain migration on the source country 
has been shown to be positive for emerging economies (see Beine et al., 2008). The 
externalities of creating incentives to high-skilled migration can thus contribute 
significantly to income growth in the sending countries by promoting human capital 
accumulation. 
3. Migration, Education, Income and Inequality 
In order to grasp the effects that potential migration scenarios could have on the size 
and composition of the European labour force, the differences in the determinants of 
migration rates by educational attainment need to be understood. Most of the 
contributions within the large body of existing theoretical and empirical literature 
devoted to the assessment of the drivers of migration concentrate on the role played by 
wage and income differentials across countries.  
That income in both the sending and in the destination countries is an important 
determinant of the migration decision is widely accepted, and there is little dispute 
about the relevance of income differentials when explaining migration behaviour using 
theoretical methods or econometric specifications.5 Grogger and Hanson (2011) further 
enrich our understanding of the relationship between income and migration flows by 
disaggregating the income variable by educational attainment. In their analysis they 
find evidence for positive selection and positive sorting of migrants. Exploiting 
information on education-related income differences across and within countries, they 
show that larger differences in high-skilled and low-skilled income gaps between 
countries increase the emigration of high-skilled population (positive selection). Thus, 
(relatively) high rewards to skills in destination countries foster the emigration of 
(relatively) high-skilled individuals. In addition, large skill-related wage differentials in 
host countries attract relatively more high-skilled individuals (positive sorting), which 
can be interpreted as a confirmation of an income maximization behaviour of migrants. 
Positive sorting is present when both pre-tax and post-tax income is used, but appears 
considerably stronger for post-tax income.  
Due to data limitations, most of the existing empirical evidence is based on a subset of 
countries and bilateral migration flows are included if the destination country is a 
developed country. Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2013) overcome this shortfall using a 
statistical method that allows the identification of parameters in a gravity model without 
observing bilateral migration flows, but only net migration flows, which are simple 
aggregates of the desired bilateral flows. This approach allows testing whether income 
                                                     
5
 See Karemera et al. (2000), Hatton and Williamson (2003a, 2003b), Lewer and Van den Berg (2008), 
Mayda (2010), Beine et al. (2011) or Ortega and Peri (2013) for recent analyses. 
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elasticities vary across broad migration corridors (as defined by broad South/North 
migration flows). Their findings suggest that GDP per capita in the destination country 
is particularly important for South-South migration flows. Although still positive, the 
effect is significantly smaller for North-North/South-North movements. Low GDP per 
capita in the origin country acts as a push factor of migration, in particular for South-
North and for North-South migratory flows. Studies concentrating on emigration out of 
developing countries find that the relationship between income in the source country 
and migration follows an inverse U-shaped pattern (Hatton and Williamson 2003a, 
Pedersen et al. 2008). Initially poor countries tend to exhibit higher emigration in the 
course of their development – a finding that seems to contradict the notion of migration 
being an instrument to improve an individual’s economic situation. Hatton and 
Williamson (2003a) argue that the findings possibly indicate that due to poverty 
constraints the cost of migrating is prohibitively high for a considerable share of the 
population and increases in average income relax the constraint and enable 
emigration. The implications of this result are straightforward: economic development in 
low income countries must not necessarily lead to lower migration from these countries 
as implied by the income maximization hypothesis. If the income gains do not outweigh 
the benefit of the relaxation of the poverty constraint, increased out-migration of low 
income countries could be observed until they reach a certain level of development. 
Theoretical as well as micro data based, empirical evidence has shown that on top of 
absolute income differences, also the relative position of individuals in the income 
distribution influences an individual’s migration decision. Stark (1984) and Stark and 
Taylor (1989, 1991) introduce the concept of relative deprivation as a driver for 
migration arguing that the feeling of relative deprivation (or poverty) creates a disutility 
and affected individuals could choose to migrate in order to improve their relative 
position in the income distribution. Formally, relative deprivation for a given individual is 
calculated as the share of individuals being richer times the average excess income, 
and when aggregated to the regional/country level, this measure is closely related to 
the Gini coefficient of income inequality. The lack of empirical results in a cross country 
setting motivates Raggl (2014) to study the impact of relative deprivation/inequality on 
migration decisions on the cross country level. Exploiting data on migration rates by 
educational attainment level, heterogeneities among migrants with different educational 
backgrounds can be revealed. The findings suggest that an increase in relative 
deprivation, measured by the Gini coefficient, leads to a reduction in total immigration 
rates of countries, after controlling for GDP per capita, unemployment, human capital, 
the size of the population as well as country and year fixed effects. As predicted by 
theory, the impact of changes in relative deprivation on the migration decision varies by 
the educational attainment of the migrants: Relative deprivation has no impact of the 
immigration rates of primary educated individuals, but very well on the rates of 
immigrants with secondary and tertiary education. Higher income inequality reduces 
the inflow of medium and high skilled migrants, holding all other factors constant. 
Increases in GDP per capita on the other hand have, although a positive, a comparably 
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small effect on the immigration of tertiary educated, and appear to be more effective to 
attract primary and secondary educated migrants.  
A similar analysis relates relative deprivation in the sending country to emigration rates 
of countries. The link between Gini coefficients and emigration rates is positive overall, 
supporting the hypothesis of income inequality acting as a push factor of migration. 
Allowing heterogeneous effects across education specific emigration rates shows that 
low skilled individuals react stronger to changes in income inequality. Thus, additional 
migration induced by widening income gaps in the source countries would be more 
pronounced among the group of low-skilled migrants. A decrease in relative deprivation 
in the countries of origin is expected to reduce the number of total emigrants and at the 
same time to change the educational decomposition of migrants towards higher 
average education levels of migrants. 
The analysis shows that differences in absolute income across countries are by no 
means sufficient to explain global migration flows. Effective policies require the 
consideration of the distribution of income, in addition to the level of income and 
employment opportunities. 
Apart from economic reasons, several other determinants of migration have been 
identified in the empirical literature. Institutional factors and immigration policies in the 
destination countries, such as accessibility of visas and selective immigration quotas 
can constitute stringent barriers to entry for prospective immigrants. Clark et al. (2007) 
assess the determinants of the temporal variations in the source country composition of 
immigrants for the United States. They find that in addition to income and education 
variables, migration policy measured by different dimensions of immigration quotas 
crucially shape both the level and source country composition of immigrants. Related 
country-specific policies are regulations on the portability of qualifications and social 
benefits across national boundaries. The importance of the transferability of human 
capital for a non-discriminatory labour market access of migrants as well as the 
potential gains for the receiving countries have been emphasized repeatedly in the 
literature (Bloom and Grant, 2001, Bonin et al., 2008, Chiswick and Miller, 2009). 
Likewise, the portability of social security benefits – or the lack thereof – has been a 
subject of analysis in recent literature (Holzmann et al., 2005, Koettl, 2009, Holzmann 
and Koettl, 2011). Avato et al. (2010) collect and present global data on the degree of 
social protection among migrants. They observe considerable differences across 
migrants from different source countries, and find that in particular South-South 
migrants have poor access to social protection. The highest form social protection 
guarantees the portability of social benefits upon (further, return) migration. The data 
suggest that less than one quarter of all global migrants is covered by bilateral 
agreements that are necessary for portability. Most likely due to the lack of appropriate 
data these latter factors received scant attention in empirical cross country studies, 
although they constitute important pull factors of migration. 
Additionally, health and demographic factors play an important role in explaining 
migration flows. Migrants tend to be young, thus countries with a relatively large share 
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of young individuals are characterized by higher emigration rates (see for instance 
Hatton and Williamson, 2003b). 
In spite of pull and push factors, the desire to migrate can remain unrealized if the cost 
of migrating are prohibitively high – direct transport and travelling cost are one part, but 
indirect cost resulting from learning a new language, culture, adapting to foreign 
institutions and administrative structures, job search and the lack of supportive safety 
nets provided by the family, must not be neglected. The cost of migration can be 
significantly reduced by communities of previous emigrants in other countries and the 
resulting networks that provide information, support and guidance. In addition, family 
reunification policies can facilitate visa reception. Pedersen et al. (2008) show 
empirically that the higher the stock of previous migrants from a given country residing 
in a destination, the higher the subsequent migration flows of individuals coming from 
the same country. This effect is stronger for migrants originating in poor source 
countries, indicating that the presence of networks is of particular importance for 
migrants from developing countries. Communities of previous migrants from a given 
country are not only found to increase subsequent migration, but also to lower the 
average educational attainment of the migrants (Beine et al., 2011). 
A recent strand of the literature assesses the link between environmental factors and 
migration. Several studies conceptualize the possible channels through which 
environmental change can affect migratory behaviour. McLeman and Smit (2006) 
argue that depending on the vulnerability and the adaptive capacity of individuals, 
migration can be a possible response to climate change and its consequences such as 
higher average temperatures, extreme weather events or rising sea levels. Perch-
Nielsen et al. (2008) study the impact of rising ocean levels and floods on migration 
conceptually in the context of other adaption strategies and conclude that floods are 
not likely to trigger permanent mass migration, whereas in the event of rising sea 
levels, due to the implied permanent loss of land, migration can be an important coping 
strategy. Black et al. (2011) argue that in addition to economic, political, social and 
demographic factors, also environmental factors play a key role in explaining migration 
flows. They accentuate that environmental factors need to be studied in interaction with 
other drivers of migration as they are likely to amplify or abate the migratory response. 
The lack of empirical studies on a global scale impedes a quantitative assessment of 
the impact of environmental factors on migration.  
4. The Future(s) of Migration in Europe  
4.1 Projecting migration flows in Europe: Benchmark trends 
How are migration flows to Europe expected to change in the future? Given the overall 
linkages between bilateral migration flows, income and population developments 
unveiled by Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2013), benchmark projections can be obtained. 
These embody the expected changes in migration flows based on scenarios for 
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consistent population dynamics and GDP changes which represent realistic future 
developments.  
Using the elasticities obtained in Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2013), projections of 
migration flows to the EU can be obtained for a scenario based on the continuation of 
existing global trends in human capital accumulation. Using the population growth and 
GDP projections recently developed by Lutz et al. (2014) and Crespo Cuaresma 
(2014), respectively, we calculate benchmark projections of migration flows to EU15 for 
the coming decades (2010-2050). In particular, we use a scenario where we assume 
that educational expansion patterns at the global level follow the trends observed 
historically.6 Income convergence forces, fertility and mortality are assumed to follow 
benchmark dynamics representing a “middle-of-the-road” scenario. 
Figure 7 presents the projected change in migration flows to EU15 countries in the 
period 2010-2050 against the GDP per capita of the origin country, as well as against 
the educational difference of immigrants. Based on the projection results, the expected 
relative increase in migrant population to EU15 appears particularly large for origin 
countries with relatively low average GDP per capita, as well as for those with relatively 
high income. While this last group is mostly explained by the continuation of within-EU 
migration patterns, the projections also imply a consolidation of stable migration flows 
from many Sub-Saharan African economies. Comparing the expected changes in 
migration flows with the average education differential of migrants by country of origin 
(see bottom panel in Figure 7) does not reveal any particular relationship between the 
two variables. Such a result implies that matching the skills of migrants with the needs 
of the European labour market so as to efficiently make use of the potential of 
migration may require targeted policies in destination countries. Programs aimed to 
adapt the human capital acquired in source countries by immigrants are expected to 
reduce the incidence of skill mismatch in European labour markets and lead to a better 
integration of migrants.  
The fact that different world regions are going through different phases of the 
demographic transition and thus present different distributions of population by age 
group affects the profile of migrants to Europe. As migrants tend to be young, 
economies with expanding populations and relatively large young cohorts are likely to 
generate larger emigration flows than relatively “older” countries. Apart from Sub-
Saharan African countries, also South-Central and Western Asian countries currently 
face high young-age dependency ratios. At the same time, the level of economic 
development of these countries tends to be low, so that in particular for countries 
allocated at the left in Figure 7 (top) the expected change in immigration could be 
underestimated by the projected scenario (which does not directly account for age 
distribution dynamics in source countries). 
                                                     
6
 The projections correspond to the so-called SSP2 projections in the framework of the Shared Socioeconomic 
Pathways developed for climate research (see Krieger et al., 2014). Lutz et al. (2014) present a thorough discussion 
of the assumptions concerning changes in fertility by educational attainment level behind this scenario. 
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Figure 7 Log change in projected immigration to EU between 2010 and 2050 by GDP 
per capita in 2000 (top) and by difference in educational attainment between 
migrants and EU natives (bottom) 
 
 
Source: Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2013) 
Note: The vertical axis shows the percentage change (0.5 implies an increase by 50%) between the projected 
immigration to EU15 countries by country of origin in 2010 and 2050. 
 
The education of emigrants from these countries that live in European countries is 
lower on average than that of EU natives. This is little surprising, as low income 
countries tend to have lower levels of educational attainment than EU countries. That 
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this finding does not imply that Europe receives a negative selection of the emigrants 
becomes clear when the education differentials of the emigrants with respect to the 
source country population are compared. Migrants originating in countries with 
expanding populations, mainly Sub-Saharan African and Western and South-Central 
Asian countries, exhibit relatively higher skill differentials between emigrants and the 
source country population than emigrants from countries with a lower share of young 
people. Europe, as a host region for immigrants from countries with a large share of 
young individuals is thus likely to benefit from an educational expansion in these 
countries. 
4.2 Wage differentials and sorting of migrants 
Skill related wage differentials in European countries are considerably smaller than in 
the United States (see Figure 8, based on data of 15 high income countries obtained 
from Grogger and Hanson, 2011). In Europe, the United Kingdom, Denmark and 
Norway exhibit the highest wage gaps between low and high skilled individuals, and yet 
they amount to merely two thirds of the gaps observed for the United States. The 
empirical evidence provided by Grogger and Hanson (2011) links relatively high skill 
related wage differentials in the destination countries to increased inflows of highly 
educated migrants. Countries with low skill premiums (Italy, Spain, Austria or Belgium 
are examples) appear to be disadvantaged in their ability to attract high skilled workers.  
A comparison with the experience of Canada and Australia appears worthwhile in this 
context. Both of these countries present differences between wages of low and high 
skilled workers that are comparable to those in European countries, but a significantly 
higher share of skilled immigrants. Such an outcome is the result of migration policies 
that strongly target skilled migration. As compared to the US migration policy model, 
that rests mainly on the selection of migrants by employers Canadian migration policy 
is based on the selection of permanent immigrants using a point systems where skills 
related to formal education and language constitute the main admission criteria. The 
Australian model is conceptually between the US and Canadian migration policy 
frameworks. It uses a point system but involves consultations with industry 
representatives so as to achieve a realistic assessment of the skills that the labour 
market requires at a given point in time. While the Canadian approach to migration 
policy is dubbed a “human capital model”, Australian migration policy is understood as 
being a “neo-corporatist model” (Koslowsky, 2014). Assessments of such migration 
policies such as that presented by Koslowsky (2014) indicate that the Canadian model 
has been particularly successful in attracting migrants with tertiary education 
attainment levels. The Australian model, however, is deemed more efficient when it 
comes to utilizing the skills provided by migrants. The “brain waste” that the human 
capital model can cause has led to calls for European countries not to adopt it 
(Thränhardt, 2014).   
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Figure 8 Wage differentials between high and low skilled for 15 OECD countries 
 
Source: Grogger and Hanson (2011), http://harris.uchicago.edu/research/data/migration-data; Wage differentials are 
approximated by the difference between the 80th and the 20th percentile of the income distribution for 25-64 year olds 
(USD, 2000 prices) obtained using data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and averaged over 1994-2000. 
4.3 How different are migrants? Fertility and intergenerational 
educational mobility among immigrants 
Inflows of young immigrants contribute to population change not only directly, but also 
indirectly through higher fertility rates. Figure 9 shows total fertility rates of women with 
a foreign background living in European countries as compared to native European 
women and women with national citizenships. In most countries, both, women who are 
foreign born and women who have a foreign citizenship tend to have higher total fertility 
rates than native born women and women with a national citizenship. Malta, Estonia, 
Denmark, Ireland, Island as well as the Czech Republic constitute exceptions. 7 
The dynamics of fertility differentials over time are important ingredients to the indirect 
contribution of immigration on the size of the labour force. The changes of total fertility 
rates during 2009 and 2011 show that fertility rates of women with a foreign 
background are more volatile than those of natives. In most countries, fertility rates of 
both women with foreign and with national citizenship declined after 2009. In Bulgaria, 
                                                     
7
 Also studies relying on individual level data come to similar conclusions. Anderson (2004) studies the difference in 
fertility rates between native swedes and immigrants and finds that in particular immediately after immigration, 
fertility rates are higher among migrants. Mayer and Riphahn (2000) use individual level panel data from Germany 
and find that immigrants tend to have higher fertility rates upon migration, but the gaps decrease with the duration of 
stay. 
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Greece, Italy and Hungary and Island, fertility rates of foreign women dropped by more 
than 15%. In most other countries, the decrease was less pronounced. In Lithuania, 
and to a lower extent also in Denmark, Latvia and Austria, fertility rates of women with 
national citizenships were rising and so did the rates for foreign citizenship holders 
(except in Austria).  
Figure 9 Total fertility for foreign born and native born women (left) and total fertility 
women with foreign and national citizenship (right) 
  
The green line is a 45-degree line and the dashed line represents a linear fit. All values represent averages for the 
period 2009 to 2011. 
Source: Own computations based on Eurostat data (Statistics in focus 13/2013) 
 
The most striking change in fertility rates of foreign citizenship occurred in Lithuania: 
Average fertility rates of women with a foreign citizenship increased from 3.18 to 4.70 
between 2009 and 2011.  
Overall, the data suggest that on average there is a falling trend in fertility rates of 
women that hold national citizenships and in most countries also total fertility rates of 
women of foreign citizenship declined. Comparing simple averages over countries 
shows that fertility rates of women with national citizenships decreased slightly over the 
three years under consideration.  
While in the majority of countries also the fertility rates of women with foreign 
citizenship fell, due to a small number of countries that experienced relatively high 
increases in fertility rates in this group, the European average increased slightly. 
Although based on this data no conclusive evidence for the future development can be 
derived, the currently higher fertility rates among immigrants suggest for most countries 
a relative increase of the population of second generation migrants. To which extent 
this expected development is beneficial for Europe’s economy is tightly linked to the 
educational attainment that second generation migrants are expected to achieve. The 
evidence provided by Schneebaum et al. (2014) shows that intergenerational 
educational immobility – the dependence of children’s educational attainment on their 
parents’ educational attainment – is particularly pronounced among immigrants. Within 
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the group of immigrants a striking gender difference impedes educational advancement 
of females to a considerably larger extent than that of males. 
This persistence implies that if no counteracting polices are undertaken, the current 
educational attainment of immigrants will to a great extent determine the education 
levels of the second generation migrants. Typically, the shares of migrants with low 
education as well as the shares of migrants with high education are both higher than 
those of natives and cause an underrepresentation of those with middle (upper and 
post-secondary) education attainment. Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Sweden and the United Kingdom are 
examples for countries with comparably few immigrants with secondary education, a 
considerable overrepresentation of immigrants with less than completed secondary 
education and a slight overrepresentation of immigrants with tertiary education.8 
Hungary, Ireland and Portugal, and to a lower extent also Spain and Italy, 
accommodate immigrants that exhibit higher shares of tertiary education than their 
native counterparts.   
4.4 How different are migrants? Welfare dependence and 
migration  
Beyond contributing to the productive sector, migrants generate additional revenues to 
European welfare systems and thus improve the sustainability of public finance in the 
context of ageing societies. Often, however, the media discourse tends to demonize 
migration by claiming that immigrants constitute a particularly sizeable burden for 
European welfare states. Empirical studies aiming at quantifying the differential 
between natives and migrants in terms of welfare benefits tend to encounter statistical 
difficulties due to the fact that selection into benefit take-up can differ between the two 
groups, thus leading to biased inference. 
Huber and Oberdabernig (2014) present the most complete empirical assessment 
available dealing with welfare dependence of migrants in Europe. Once that the 
potential sample selection bias is taken into account, the results in Huber and 
Oberdabernig (2014) robustly show that the welfare dependence of European 
immigrants is at most similar to that of natives. A very large part of the existing 
differences between natives and immigrants in either benefit take-up or benefit levels 
can be explained by differences in observable characteristics between the two groups. 
Once that these are taken into account, the empirical analysis shows that immigrants 
tend to receive benefits as often or less often than natives and that the size of such 
benefits tends to be comparable or lower. These results provide further evidence 
                                                     
8
 This comparison is based on OECD (2007). The following EU countries are considered in the analysis: Austria, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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concerning the positive spillovers that migration is expected to provide as a 
counteracting factor to ageing dynamics in Europe. 
5. Policy Conclusions 
Based on the theoretical and empirical evidence presented above, this section 
summarizes a portfolio of policies that can help European countries to benefit the most 
from its immigrants both in terms of a growing working age population and in terms of 
human capital accumulation.  
The complex nature of migration dynamics and the breadth of influencing factors 
complicate a clear classification of the policies proposed. We thus merely suggest a 
loose allocation of the policies to three broad categories that are defined based on the 
main scope of the policy. We begin with policies that can influence the size and the 
characteristics of immigrants prior to the act of migration. By providing an attractive 
environment, European countries can improve the so-call “pull-factors” of migration, 
which contribute to the desirability of Europe as a region of destination. In particular, 
we suggest that evident differences between EU15 and EU13 countries are addressed, 
and the institutional environment is strengthened in countries that are currently typical 
source countries of migrants. Furthermore, we propose that agreements that enable 
the portability of social security benefits across countries are extended and made 
inclusive to a large part of the migrant population.  
Policies aimed at tackling the observed disadvantages experienced by immigrants 
already being part of the European population constitute the second block. Establishing 
equality in the access to education, labour markets and institutions for migrants and 
their descendants are important prerequisites for a successful integration of migrants. 
The importance of non-discriminatory admission to (pre-)schools and diploma 
recognition of foreign-born labour market participants receive particular attention in this 
context. 
Finally, we bring to attention often neglected factors that shape migration dynamics and 
recommend that policy areas only secondarily linked to migration outcomes should be 
evaluated also in light of their indirect consequences on migration. Especially, we 
discuss the role of redistributive policies and their indirect influence on the size and 
skill-decomposition of migrants. 
A clear allocation of policies to the three groups is not always possible, as in particular 
policies targeted towards a reduction of economic or social disadvantages faced by 
immigrants will likewise improve the attractiveness of Europe as a destination. 
Therefore, we refrain in the following from any further classification and discuss each of 
the proposed policies in the light of the empirical findings and recent literature. 
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Managing heterogeneity 
Throughout the analysis of the challenges of migration to Europe a large degree of 
heterogeneity across European countries is evident. The comparison of the expected 
impact of migration on the future age structure of the populations of countries identified 
a considerable gap between EU15 (accession pre-2004) and EU13 (accession 2004 or 
after) countries. While the EU15 population is projected to gain substantially from 
immigration – in terms of the size of the labour force and in terms of its age structure, 
the demographic structure of EU13 countries is expected not to be affected positively 
by immigration. On the contrary, some of the new member states are typical emigration 
countries that lose a considerable part of their (in many cases well educated) labour 
force to migration. To the extent that the returns to human capital accumulation are 
higher in countries with high emigration rates for skilled individuals, incentives are 
expected to lead to better outcomes in terms of educational attainment also in these 
source countries. The effects of increasing educational attainment in Central and 
Eastern European economies are expected to fuel growth in the region and income 
convergence in the continent (see Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2013, for example). 
However, the challenges posed by ageing populations in these countries need to be 
explicitly addressed by national governments. Making Central and Eastern Europe an 
attractive destination for migrants needs to be one of the important elements of such 
policy efforts.  
In addition, ensuring the productive use of remittances in source countries is important 
for enduring their growth-enhancing effect. In the new EU member states remittances 
amount to roughly 2% of GDP on average9, and the implications of remittances on 
economic development are important indirect consequences of emigration. It is 
empirically unambiguous that remittances tend to reduce poverty rates of sending 
countries (Adams and Page, 2005, Acosta et al., 2008 and Gupta et al., 2009) but the 
impact of remittances on economic growth is much debated. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 
(2009) argue that remittances can be an important source for liquidity in countries 
where financial systems are poorly developed and thereby increase growth through 
investment, while others argue that adverse labour market effects can be a 
consequence of remittances, as the additional income can reduce the labour force 
participation in the receiving countries (Barajas et al., 2009). Catrinescu et al. (2009) 
show that when accounting for the institutional environment of a country, remittances 
contribute to long term growth and that this effect is particularly large if the institutional 
quality in the recipient countries is high. Political and economic policies and institutions 
that favour and incentivize investment and saving of remittances are thus important 
prerequisites for a beneficial effect of remittances on economic growth.  
                                                     
9
 This is the EU13 average of the share of remittances in GDP for the year 2013 according to the World Development 
Indicators. For comparison, average remittances amount to 0.8% in GDP in EU15 countries. 
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Enhance the portability of social benefits across countries 
For both the initial migration decision as well as for potential return migration intentions 
the loss of entitlements for social benefits due to a lack of portability across countries is 
an influential and potentially harmful factor. If social benefits are accumulated prior to 
migration, the location choice might depend on bilateral agreements that ensure their 
portability. In consequence, if such agreements are lacking the implicit cost of losing 
the benefits can be prohibitively high. Return migration is seriously disadvantaged if 
social entitlements cannot be transferred back to the initial sending country. In addition, 
Holzmann et al. (2005) argue that the incentives for contributing to social security 
systems are lower for migrants that have return intentions whenever the benefits 
cannot be (fully) transferred to their origin country. A possible result can be increased 
employment in the informal sector among migrants. Holzmann et al. (2005) estimate 
that for roughly half of the immigrants to Europe bilateral agreements exist that 
guarantee an advanced portability of social security entitlements between the 
European host and the initial sending country. For one third of European immigrants 
there exists the possibility for transfers of the benefits (e.g. the pension when entitled, 
not the acquired years of contribution) – referred to as exportability10 - to the sending 
country in the absence of bilateral agreements. The extent of that regulation depends 
on the national law of the destination country. Roughly 20% of immigrants are 
estimated to participate in the informal sector and have very limited access to social 
security which makes the question for the portability of benefits redundant.   
Although when compared to other receiving regions the possibility for portability is most 
advanced in European countries, several shortcomings should be in the focus of 
European policy makers. While exportability of pension benefits is usually in place in all 
EU countries (i.e. pensions are paid independently of the country of residence of the 
recipient), if bilateral agreements do not guarantee portability, the benefits might be lost 
if the eligibility is not reached upon emigration/return migration (Koettl, 2009). In most 
continental European countries pension payments are tied to a minimum of 15 years of 
contribution and if this requirement is not met, in an absence of bilateral agreements all 
entitlements can be forgone. According to Holzmann et al. (2005) roughly half of all 
immigrants to Europe are affected by this lack of agreements that allow for portability.  
Furthermore, the share of global migrants that are not covered by a bilateral portability 
agreements varies to a large extent by the income group of the sending countries: 
While 86% of emigrants from high income OECD countries are covered by a bilateral 
agreement, only 2%, 15% and 16% of emigrants from low, lower-middle and upper-
middle income countries, respectively, are covered by an agreement (Holzmann and 
Koettl, 2014; for a classification by geographical region of origin see Avato et al., 2010). 
Although these gaps might partially stem from differential destination choices of 
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 See Avato et al. (2010) for a discussion of portability vs. exportability of social security entitlements, and for a 
thorough expansion of the analysis to middle and low income host countries. 
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migrants, they may indicate a discrimination of migrants from other than high income 
countries. Although systematic differences of social security systems between 
European countries and many low and middle income countries complicate bilateral 
agreements, in emerging policies the necessity for an extended, non-discriminatory 
portability of social security should be considered. 
Improving intergenerational educational mobility among immigrants as a 
policy priority 
The fact that total fertility rates of migrant women are larger than those of native 
women implies that an increase in the relative share of second generation migrants can 
be expected. High intergenerational immobility of education among immigrants, in 
particular among female immigrants and immigrants from non-EU countries, impedes 
educational advancement of the descendants of parents with low educational 
attainment. Altzinger et al. (2014) elaborate a set of policies that help paving the road 
towards more equal opportunities for children with different socioeconomic 
backgrounds. An important prerequisite for smoothing the chances for upward mobility 
of migrant and native children is public investment in education. Investments should in 
particular be targeted towards the promotion and expansion of pre-school programs to 
ensure equal access to education at an early stage. Improving the access to language 
courses for children – physically as well as financially – is another important 
precondition for a successful equalization of starting conditions among children with 
and without migration background.  
Early tracking systems that require the choice for an educational path at an early stage 
of a child’s educational career are likely to reinforce intergenerational educational 
immobility among migrants. Schneeweis and Zweimüller (2014), for instance, show 
using Austrian data that early tracking significantly harms students from poorer 
socioeconomic backgrounds. The earlier the choice for a certain school type is due, the 
more likely it is that the parents – which could have information disadvantages as 
compared to natives – and family background characteristic influence the choice of the 
track in a potentially unfavourable way. Tracking programs have also been shown to be 
associated with inequality in educational outcomes (OECD 2010) and negatively affect 
immigrants and their families.  
Promoting access to vocational training should also constitute a cornerstone of the 
policy package aimed at improving the beneficial spillovers of migration. Improving 
access to vocational education for females with a foreign background, a group that has 
shown to be especially disadvantaged in that respect, appears particularly urgent in 
this context (see also Altzinger et al., 2014). 
Avoiding brain waste and overqualified migrant work 
Matching educational background of migrants and employment in an efficient manner 
is a key requirement to overcome the expected negative effects of demographic 
developments in Europe. Policies aimed at improving the efficiency and transparency 
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of administrative processes for diploma recognition appear necessary to avoid skill 
mismatch. Joint efforts of receiving and sending countries involving social partners and 
policy makers are required for such policies to be successful. Sending countries need 
to credibly ensure that their qualification framework is in line with that in EU countries, 
while targeted bilateral actions in sectors which may benefit from migrant skills should 
be encouraged in receiving economies (see for example the recommendations in 
Schuster et al., 2013, and Desiderio and Schuster, 2013). 
The existence of migrant networks plays a central role as a pull factor in migration 
decisions. Attracting migrants from countries which have a limited stock of natives 
living in the receiving country can thus be difficult due to limitations in information, in 
particular for low-skill migrants. The promotion of government agencies and non-
governmental organizations whose role is the provision of such information can at the 
same time improve skill matching and enlarge the pool of migrants from relatively 
underrepresented source countries.    
Such actions should ensure an improved labour market matching of migrants and skill 
demand, as well as improving mobility of educated individuals and facilitating return 
migration and the subsequent brain gain effects for Central and Eastern European 
economies and non-EU countries.       
Facilitating labour market integration of migrants 
The chances of immigration relieving European pay-as-you-go social security systems 
hinge, inter alia, on whether migrants manage to integrate in the labour markets of host 
countries. The literature on the labour market integration of migrants, however, often 
finds that migrants face substantially lower chances of being employed (and higher 
ones of being unemployed) than natives and that the success of migrants in integrating 
in host country labour market varies widely across countries (Dustmann and Frattini 
2011, 2014; OECD, 2008, Algan et al, 2010, Münz, 2007).  
European integration policies towards immigrants have to focus on: a) selecting and 
attracting migrants that are willing and capable to integrate in the host countries’ labour 
markets through appropriate migration policies, b) devising appropriate regional 
policies to support integration and potentially also influencing the settlement structure 
of migrants and c) adjusting the institutional structure of the economy to be better able 
to integrate migrants. 
A number of authors have suggested instruments that could be used to implement 
these policy objectives. Rendall et al. (2010) and Cangiano (2012), amongst others, 
argue that migrants entering the host country as refugees or in family reunion schemes 
often have less favourable characteristics for labour market integration than migrants 
entering under labour market quota and the welfare magnet hypothesis of migration 
(Borjas, 1999). While migrants with lower chances of labour market integration may be 
particularly attracted to countries with a generous welfare state, theories on the self-
selectivity of migrants (Borjas 1987, Chiswick 1999) argue that less skilled migrants 
should be particularly strongly drawn to countries where the wage structure is 
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compressed. In addition, quite a few studies have also found that integration success 
varies substantially among migrants from different sending regions. 
Devising selective immigration policies that focus on the skills of migrants, providing 
privileged access to labour migrants and potentially also to migrants from certain 
regions are likely to be effective in selecting able migrants. Huber (2014), however, 
finds that countries with generous family migration regulations as a rule tend to get 
migrants with individual characteristics that make them less likely to integrate into host 
countries labour markets.  
Horvath and Huber (2013) argue that besides networks and segregation, also ethnic 
diversity may have effects on labour market integration of foreign born. On the one 
hand, complementarities in productivity of different ethnicities may increase labour 
demand for the foreign born and increase chances of integration. On the other hand, 
diversity also increases uncertainty with respect to the quality of migrants of a particular 
sending country group. In regions where many migrants of the same ethnicity reside, 
foreign born tend to have lower unemployment and higher employment rates, while in 
ethnically more diverse regions, all else equal, unemployment among foreign born is 
higher and employment lower. The results of Horvath and Huber (2013) therefore 
suggest that successful integration policies will have to take into account the specifics 
of the region in which they are operating and that influencing the regional settlement 
structure of migrants and potentially supporting (regional) migrant networks may be 
another policy instrument that could potentially be used to enhance migrants labour 
market integration in host countries. Quasi-experimental evidence on the settlement 
structure of asylum seekers questions the rationale for influencing the settlement 
structure of migrants.  Piil Damm (2009) emphasizes the role played by employed 
immigrants and co-ethnic contacts in the neighbourhood of residence. An efficient 
policy mix in this respect may therefore consist on not interfering with migrant 
settlements, while at the same time integrating migrants in areas where either the 
share of same ethnicity is very high (to avoid long term disintegration while at the same 
time reaping the short term benefits from integration) or which have very high diversity 
(to reap the growth benefits from diversity while at the same time improving integration) 
or to directly address issues of deprived neighbourhoods (to avoid situations in which 
migrants have little access to networks of employed migrants). 
The results in Huber (2014) suggest that in countries with more centralized wage 
bargaining, stricter product market regulation (and potentially also employment 
protection) as well as in countries with a higher union density, labour market outcomes 
of migrants relative to natives tend to be worse. This implies that at least from the 
perspective of migrant integration in host countries, flexible labour markets (to allow 
migrants to more easily enter self-employment), less centralised wage bargaining (to 
increase wage flexibility for migrants working in low wage jobs) and ensuring inclusive 
trade unions assist in facilitating the integration of migrants in host countries’ labour 
markets. The differences in institutional frameworks and relative trade union strength in 
Europe imply that the outcomes of comparable measures aimed at strengthening the 
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inclusion of migrants have been very heterogeneous across countries and sectors (see 
for example Hardy et al., 2012).11 Measures aimed at improving diversity management 
and the inclusion of migrants from the side of trade unions need to be thus tailored to fit 
the particular characteristics of the institutional settings in which they operate.  
Adding migration impact to the evaluation of redistributive policies  
Given their particular relevance as a determinant of migration flows, redistributive 
policies should be evaluated in terms of their impacts on the numbers and the skill 
composition of immigrants to European countries.  
The level of relative deprivation in destination countries has been shown to be an 
important determinant of the overall size of migration flows, as well as of the average 
educational attainment of immigrants to a given destination country. Countries with 
higher income inequality face lower immigration rates, holding other factors constant, 
as the expected higher relative deprivation causes a destination country to be less 
attractive to migrants compared to other, more equal countries (Raggl, 2014).  
Besides the effect on total immigration rates, changes in income inequality can alter the 
skill decomposition of the migrants. First empirical analyses suggest that the 
immigration rates of individuals with only primary education do not respond in a 
statistically significant way to changes in inequality. Low skilled immigrants are 
expected to be allocated at the bottom of the income distribution and their perceived 
relative deprivation is not significantly affected by the distribution of incomes that are 
higher than their own, holding other variables constant. If migrants expect to earn 
wages corresponding to the middle or upper part of the income distribution, they react 
negatively to an increase in the share of the total product held by individuals with 
higher incomes. Thus, higher relative deprivation induced by a more unequal income 
distribution reduces the shares of secondary and tertiary educated migrants, while 
leaving unchanged the shares of immigrants with primary education, which results in 
(a) fewer immigrants and (b) a lower average educational attainment of those that 
migrate. 
The average relative deprivation in the destination countries is not the only factor 
playing a role in explaining migratory flows. The characteristics of the income 
distribution in the source countries shape the number and the education structure of 
emigrants in an important way. Neglecting skill differentials of migrants and considering 
total emigration rates of countries, Raggl (2014) finds a robust positive relationship 
between the Gini coefficient of income inequality and emigration rates in a global cross-
                                                     
11
 The different approaches and views of trade unions in Europe with respect to migration policy appeared evident, for 
instance, in the context of the 2004 EU enlargement. Trade unions in countries like Germany and Austria, which 
shared borders with accession countries, were in favour of a transitional period in the free movement of labour of 
the enlarged EU, a view that contrasted strongly with those held by British or Irish trade unions. The relative 
preference of German and Austrian trade unions for restrictive migration policy has been often reported in the 
literature (see e.g. Krings, 2009). 
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section of countries. Again, important differences among emigration rates by different 
education levels can be observed in the results of the empirical analysis. Rising 
average relative deprivation in countries causes emigration rates of individuals with 
(only) primary education to increase by a larger extent than emigration rates of those 
that achieve some tertiary education. This results in a lower average educational 
attainment of emigrants. 
This set of novel empirical results has implications for the evaluation and design of 
those policies in Europe which are expected to have redistributive effects. While 
redistributive policies follow a number of wider goals than those of migration policy their 
possible effects on the number and the skill composition of migrants to European 
countries should not be neglected since - abstracting from other consequences of 
changes in the income distribution, - more equal countries exhibit lower levels of 
average relative deprivation, which in turn appear to be favoured in particular by 
secondary and tertiary educated migrants.  
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